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INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence1 is generally seen through the lens of the criminal
justice system, but such cases also pervade the civil justice system. All fifty
states currently afford domestic violence victims the right to petition for civil
protection orders.2 Through a civil protection order, a victim may obtain an
injunction, which offers several forms of relief outside of criminal
prosecution.3 While civil protection orders should guard against further abuse,
both their obtainability and their effectiveness are questionable. The
experiences of Petitioners One and Two4 illustrate some of the underlying
issues surrounding civil protection order proceedings:
Petitioner One, a twenty-four-year-old female, has dated Respondent
One for two years. They have a volatile relationship. One night, Respondent
confronted Petitioner about suspicious text messages on her cell phone. He
grabbed her by her arms, shook her, screamed at her, and threatened to hurt
her. Petitioner filed a petition for a civil protection order against Respondent.
On the day of the scheduled hearing, Petitioner informed the court that she no
1 For purposes of this Essay, the term “domestic violence” refers to a pattern of behavior—including
physical, sexual, verbal, and emotional abuse—used by one partner against another in an intimate
relationship. Margeret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence
Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2009).
2 See Laurie S. Kohn, What’s So Funny About Peace, Love, and Understanding? Restorative Justice
as a New Paradigm for Domestic Violence Intervention, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 517, 519-20 n.3 (2010)
(citing each state’s respective statute authorizing protection orders).
3 Id. at 519-20.
4 These examples have been adapted from the experiences of one of the author’s clinical clients.
As a law student, Elia Robertson spent a semester as a clinical student at Philadelphia Legal Assistance,
where she represented low-income clients in their domestic abuse and child custody matters, including
protection order proceedings.
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longer wished to pursue a protection order against Respondent and withdrew
her petition. Petitioner and Respondent left the courthouse together.5
Petitioner Two is a thirty-three-year-old female. She and Respondent
Two recently divorced. They have one child together. Respondent has
physically abused Petitioner in the past. Petitioner now seeks custody of their
child. She recently filed a petition for a protection order on behalf of the
child. On the day of the scheduled hearing, both parties entered the courtroom.
Respondent hired an attorney. Petitioner did not. After closing arguments, the
judge ruled that he did not find the Petitioner’s testimony credible and
dismissed her petition for failing to present adequate evidence of abuse.6

Neither petitioner left the process with what she sought to obtain—a
protection order.7 Domestic violence continues to plague the United States
despite the availability of civil remedies.8 Protection order petitions are filed
at an alarming rate9 and the number of women who become victims of violent

5 Notes of Elia Robertson from Philadelphia Family Court proceedings (Jan.–May 2015) (on
file with author).
6 Id.
7 Scholars and practitioners note the difficulties that domestic abuse victims face in obtaining
civil protection orders. See, e.g., Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence
Civil Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 43, 44 (2000) (noting that the difficulty of proving domestic violence in
court is a major barrier to the effectiveness of civil protection orders). As a substantive matter,
proving abuse in court may be difficult because survivors are often the only witnesses. Id. From a
practical standpoint, even when survivors report abusive incidents, fear of retribution might undermine
their willingness to testify in court. Cf. Suraji R. Wagage, When the Consequences Are Life and Death:
Pretrial Detention for Domestic Violence Offenders, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 195, 206 (2014) (“Victims’ desire
not to press charges or testify, stemming from fear of or attachment to their abusers, ha[s] frequently
hindered . . . prosecution.”). For certain minority demographics, these problems are compounded
by social and economic considerations. See Sudha Shetty & Janice Kaguyutan, Immigrant Victims of
Domestic Violence: Cultural Challenges and Available Legal Protections, NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2002), http://www.vawnet.org/applied-research-papers/print-document.
php?doc_id=384 [https://perma.cc/4SPW-J45V] (noting that many abused immigrant women—
alienated from family and other support networks—must tolerate and endure their abusive
husbands, who are their sole means of support and livelihood).
8 See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE 10 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf [https://perma.cc/
D7RW-BEA2] (finding that 22% of surveyed women report being physically assaulted by an intimate
partner at some point in their lifetime); Will Dunham, Quarter of U.S. Women Suffer Domestic Violence:
CDC, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/07/us-violence-domesticusa-idUSN0737896320080207 [https://perma.cc/56RP-ELS4] (citing a 2005 Center for Disease
Control study in which 23.6% of women reported being a victim of intimate partner violence and a
1995 government survey in which 24.8% of women reported suffering domestic violence).
9 See, e.g., Domestic Violence in the District of Columbia: 2014 Statistical Snapshot, DCCOALITION
AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://dccadv.org/img/fck/file/Domestic%20Violence%20in%
20the%20District%20of%20Columbia%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EZE-GE6U] (last visited
Apr. 15, 2016) (reporting that petitions for civil protection orders increased 7% from 2012 to 2014).
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crime by intimate partners each year remains staggeringly high.10 In light of
these statistics, many scholars have criticized the current civil response to
domestic violence as being ineffective.11 Suggestions for improvements range
from strengthening the criminal justice system’s involvement12 to eliminating
formal judicial systems and returning to community-based interventions.13
This Essay calls attention to various deficiencies underlying the civil
protection order process. It argues that the parties in the above scenarios would
have benefited from a more holistic and less adversarial approach to their
disputes. Specifically, this Essay advocates for an alternative approach to
protection order proceedings that draws on two legal theories, therapeutic
jurisprudence14 and restorative justice.15 This approach better addresses
litigants’ needs by acknowledging that complex relationships permeate
domestic violence incidents. Such an approach could alleviate systemic issues
currently facing family courts and have a lasting, positive impact on entire
communities. This Essay uses the Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act and
the Philadelphia Family Court Division as a template to highlight the
shortcomings of current family court systems. It then offers a solution to
supplement and improve upon current civil protection order proceedings.
Part I of this Essay sets forth the current civil response to domestic
violence cases, including Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act. Part II
provides an overview of both therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice
and their relationship to one another. Part III outlines the main arguments
against therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice as alternative
responses to domestic violence. Part IV tackles those criticisms and argues
that both theories can successfully coexist within the current paradigm. It
highlights the parallel goals of the current system and the two approaches and
explores their potential inclusion in existing statutes, such as Pennsylvania’s
Protection from Abuse Act. The Essay concludes by discussing how the case

10 Each year, about 588,490 women are victims of violence by an intimate partner. CALLIE MARIE
RENNISON, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197838, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS CRIME DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001, at 1 tbl.1
(2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6CS-VGFR].
11 See, e.g., Elizabeth L. MacDowell, VAWA @ 20: Improving Civil Legal Assistance for Ending Gender
Violence, CUNY L. REV. FOOTNOTE FORUM (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.cunylawreview.org/vawa-20improving-civil-legal-assistance-for-ending-gender-violence-by-elizabeth-macdowell [https://perma.cc/
M3QF-CMT4] (discussing the failure of the Violence Against Women Act to address the limitations of
civil responses to domestic violence).
12 See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1507-08 (1998) (arguing that the criminal justice system’s “preference
for treatment as punishment for domestic violence offenders is misguided”).
13 See infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text.
14 See infra subsection II.A.1.
15 See infra subsection II.A.2.
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studies of Petitioner One and Two could benefit from therapeutic
jurisprudence and restorative justice principles.
I. BACKGROUND
The current civil response to domestic violence cases consists primarily of
civil protection order proceedings. This Part provides a brief history of civil
protection order statutes and a detailed explanation of Pennsylvania’s Protection
from Abuse Act.16 It then discusses the inherent challenges underlying
protection order proceedings and their ineffectiveness in family courts.
A. Traditional Civil Remedies for Domestic Violence Cases
Civil protection order statutes serve as a critical resource for domestic
violence survivors.17 Civil protection orders function as both an alternative
and a supplement to the criminal justice system.18 Criminal sentences are
typically reserved for “well-documented, long-standing patterns of violence
or [for] particular violent acts.”19 Where criminal proceedings fail, civil
protection orders become essential to maintaining the safety of survivors
whose abusers are not criminally liable for abuse.20
1. Protection Orders Generally
Since their inception in the 1970s,21 civil protection order statutes have
expanded, both in their scope of coverage and breadth of relief.22 For example,
statutes historically only afforded relief to those in state-recognized relationships
but now extend protection to a broader array of relationships, including current
and past intimate partners and individuals who share a home.23 Similarly,
while older statutes only offered limited forms of relief (such as stay away
orders), many statutes now include “child custody, visitation, spousal and child

16
17

23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6101–6122 (2016).
Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress
and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOCIAL POL’Y & L. 567, 584 (2003).
18 Id. at 586.
19 Id.
20 See id. at 585-86 (noting that criminal prosecution is usually limited to ongoing or more
extreme instances of domestic violence).
21 Kohn, supra note 2, at 524.
22 See, e.g., Richard A. DuBose III, Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen: Through the Eyes of
the Victim—Maryland’s Civil Protection Order and the Role of the Court, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 237, 24243 (2003) (comparing the expanded definition of abuse, the classes of persons eligible for relief, and
the relief provided for in Maryland’s 1992 domestic violence statute with the previous 1980 Act).
23 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 524-25.

1562

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1557

support, and participation in court-ordered alcohol, drug, and batterer
intervention programs” as alternative forms of relief.24
2. The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act: A Case Study
The Pennsylvania Protection from Abuse Act serves as one example of a
typical civil protection order statute.25 The Act provides a civil remedy for
domestic violence survivors through Protection from Abuse (PFA) orders.26 A
Pennsylvania citizen may seek a PFA against any household or family member
including a spouse, sibling, parent, child, or current or former intimate partner.27
A judge may issue a PFA order that is classified as protection-only,28 full no
contact,29 or no contact with eviction.30 It also may include custody31 and support
provisions for cases involving minor children,32 as well as a weapons provision
ordering the perpetrator to surrender weapons in his or her possession.33
The Act defines abuse to include:
(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing
bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent
assault, indecent assault, or incest with or without a deadly weapon[;]
(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury[;]
(3) The infliction of false imprisonment . . . [;] (4) Physically or sexually
abusing minor children . . . [; and] (5) Knowingly engaging in a course of
conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including
24
25
26

Id. at 525.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6101–6122 (2016).
Id. § 6108(a). While the statute itself only refers to “protection orders,” orders entered
pursuant to the Protection from Abuse Act are referred to as PFA orders in common practice. See,
e.g., Protection from Abuse Orders (PFA), WOMENSLAW.ORG, http://www.womenslaw.org/laws_
state_type.php?id=10027&state_code=PA [https://perma.cc/F6R7-RUBQ] (last updated Jan. 9,
2015) (describing the process for obtaining protection orders in Pennsylvania and using the term
“PFA” or “protection from abuse order”).
27 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(a) (allowing a court to grant a PFA to prevent “abuse” of a
plaintiff or minor children); see also id. § 6102(a) (defining “abuse” as any of an enumerated list of
acts committed between “family or household memers, sexual or intimate partners or persons who
share biological parenthood”).
28 See id. § 6108(a)(1) (providing protection-only relief, which “[d]irect[s] the defendant to
refrain from abusing the plaintiff or minor children”).
29 See id. § 6108(a)(6) (prohibiting the defendant “from having any contact with the plaintiff
or minor children).
30 See id. § 6108(a)(2) (granting “possession to the plaintiff of the residence or household to the
exclusion of the defendant by evicting the defendant or restoring possession to the plaintiff . . . .”).
31 See id. § 6108(a)(4) (providing “temporary custody of or establishing temporary visitation
rights with regard to minor children”).
32 See id. § 6108(a)(5) (ordering “the defendant to pay financial support to those persons the
defendant has a duty to support”).
33 Id. § 6108(a)(7).
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following the person . . . under circumstances which place the person in
reasonable fear of bodily injury.34

A person seeking a PFA must first file a petition in the Court of Common
Pleas.35 If the petitioner alleges “immediate and present danger of abuse,” a
judge must hold an ex parte hearing to review the petition.36 There, the judge
decides whether to issue a temporary PFA and schedule a full hearing,
schedule a full hearing without issuing a temporary PFA, or dismiss the
petition.37 If a temporary PFA is granted, it remains in effect until the full
hearing.38 Regardless of whether the judge issues a temporary order, a full
hearing must be scheduled within ten business days of the filing of the
petition.39 Between the ex parte hearing and the full hearing, the petitioner
must serve the respondent with the PFA petition.40
At the full hearing, a judge will decide whether to issue a final PFA.41 A
final PFA may be issued after: (1) an agreement between the parties, (2) an
agreement without admission, (3) a hearing and decision by the court, or
(4) by “default,” after a hearing where the defendant failed to appear despite
proper service.42 At the hearing, both parties will have an opportunity to
testify and present evidence.43 While both parties have the right to be

34
35

Id. § 6102(a).
See PA. R. CIV. P. 1901.3(a) (providing that, with one exception, protection order actions must
begin with a petition to a court of common pleas describing the alleged acts of abuse by the defendant).
36 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107(b)(1).
37 Id. § 6107(b).
38 Id. § 6107(b)(2).
39 Id. § 6107(a).
40 Id. At a judge’s discretion, a sheriff or other designated official may serve the defendant. Id.
§ 6106(f). However, in practice, petitioners often bear the responsibility of seeking assistance from the
police. See FAMILY LAW SECTION OF THE PHILA. BAR ASS’N, PETITION FOR PROTECTION FROM
ABUSE: INSTRUCTION SHEET ¶ 5 (2011), www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/forms/domestic-relations/Petitionfor-Protection-From-Abuse-w-instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6ZR-CMVK] (suggesting that
petitioners seek service assistance from the police).
41 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(a) (allowing a judge to issue a PFA “to bring about a
cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children”).
42 See PA. R. CIV. P. 1905(e) (requiring a PFA to indicate which of the above situations led to
the order being issued).
43 See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, DECIDING CHILD CUSTODY WHEN THERE IS DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A BENCHBOOK FOR PENNSYLVANIA COURTS 49-60 (rev. 2013), http://www.
womenslawproject.org/resources/Benchbook_FINAL_Mar2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7KP-35K3]
(noting that evidence presented in PFA hearings is governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence
and discussing considerations for particular types of evidence presented in the domestic violence
context, including victim testimony, evidence of criminal conduct, photographs, business records,
and expert testimony).
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represented,44 most are not.45 If a final PFA is issued, a petitioner is entitled
to court-ordered protection for up to three years.46 When a respondent
violates either a temporary or a final PFA, a petitioner may call the police, who
will arrest the respondent and charge him or her with criminal contempt, or
may file a complaint for criminal contempt even in the absence of an arrest.47
Statistics from Philadelphia illustrate the relative frequency of the varying
levels of protection available through the courts. In 2013, the Philadelphia
Family Court, the largest family court system in Pennsylvania, disposed of
almost 10,000 PFA petitions.48 In over half of those cases, the petitioner did not
appear for the hearing.49 In 1103 cases, the petitioner withdrew the petition.50
Among the remaining approximately 3000 dispositions, almost half resulted in
stipulations or agreements between the parties.51 Of 12,000 total petitioners who
filed for protection orders in 2013, only 1060 received final orders.52
44 See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6111 (“A domestic violence counselor/advocate may accompany a
party to any legal proceeding or hearing under this chapter.”).
45 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response
to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 109 (2001)
(citing a study of Maricopa County, Arizona, which found that in 1990, at least one of the parties in
family law cases was unrepresented in over 88% of cases). An abused litigant’s ability to secure a
PFA—specifically, one that affords adequate relief—often turns on whether that party retained
representation in the matter. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 845 (1993)
(“[B]attered women who can obtain legal assistance from trained counsel are much more likely to
receive civil protection orders which contain complete and effective relief.”). The disparity in results
between represented and unrepresented parties is particularly troubling given that a sizable majority
of litigants in domestic violence cases proceed without representation. See, e.g., Susan B. Sorenson,
Violence Against Women in Philadelphia—A Report to the City 15 (2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1180&context=spp_papers [https://perma.cc/
5SRQ-5S4H] (indicating that about four out of five petitioners in Philadelphia proceed without
representation). In addition to enduring the emotional and physical trauma, a litigant without counsel
must be vigilant to become acquainted with and abide by the many nuanced procedural and substantive
rules attendant to civil litigation. Cf. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court,
47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 748 (2015) (“[P]ro se parties routinely flunk basic procedural entrance exams
. . . . Failure to clear procedural hurdles often results in negative case outcomes . . . .”). For further
discussion on pro se litigants see infra Section I.B.2.
46 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108(d).
47 PA. R. CIV. P. § 1901.5.
48 Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, Protection from Abuse, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. PA.,
http://www.pacourts.us/news-and-statistics/research-and-statistics/protection-from-abuse [https://
perma.cc/RPW7-9H6X] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (select “Philadelphia”).
49 In 5533 cases, the plaintiff did not appear. Id.
50 Id.
51 See id. (reporting that 1346 cases were resolved by stipulation or agreement).
52 A number of variables account for the discrepancy between the volume of PFA filings and
the limited number of petitioners receiving final orders. For instance, petitioners may decline to
pursue their PFA on account of fear or attachment to their abuser. See supra note 7. Procedural
mechanisms may also impede or wholly deter service of process. See Sorenson, supra note 45, at 17
(“[P]etitioner[s] . . . risk[] further abuse when attempting to serve court papers on the defendant.”).
The inherent complexity of filing and subsequently prosecuting a PFA may also attribute to the
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B. Unique Challenges Presented by Protection Order Proceedings
While crucial, the process to obtain a PFA is far from ideal. Nationwide,
scholars and practitioners alike cite to logistical infirmities that pervade the
process of both obtaining and enforcing PFA orders.53 Protection order
proceedings pose unique challenges for litigants and attorneys alike. Among
them, congested court dockets, inadequate resources, unrepresented
litigants, and challenging subject matter are most prominent. This Section
analyzes each challenge in turn.
1. Congested Court Dockets and Inadequate Resources
Most family court systems operate without essential resources. They lack
adequate judicial training,54 evidence gathering assistance, expert witness
services, and the capability to handle high-risk cases.55 Some scholars
attribute this lack of resources in part to the sheer volume of case filings.56 In

inverse ratio between filings and final orders; cf. id. (“The process is complex, particularly for the
more than one in five Philadelphia residents who lack basic literacy skills.”).
53 See supra note 7.
54 Judges receive specialized training with which to treat domestic violence cases. See, e.g.,
Sorenson, supra note 45, at 18 (“[J]udges [in Philadelphia] participate in two statewide conferences
each year as well as self-initiated in-service training over a lunch hour each month.”). That said, such
trainings alone are likely insufficient. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting for Judges,
58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1072 n.52 (1995) (“The judicial education provided should be much more than
an hour or two of talking heads.”). This problem becomes exacerbated in light of family courts’
resource deficiency. See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, JUSTICE IN THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DIVISION OF PHILADELPHIA FAMILY COURT: A REPORT TO THE COMMUNITY 11 (2003),
http://www.womenslawproject.org/resources/WLP_FamlyCourt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HD5BNCLB] (“While court administrators have been working hard to improve the experience of litigants
in the Domestic Relations Division, they are severely limited by the amount of available resources.”);
FAMILY COURT TASK FORCE, THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, A CALL TO ACTION: THE
CRISIS IN FAMILY COURT
9-11,
16-17
(2009),
http://moderncourts.org/files/
2013/10/a_call_to_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/D56M-LJQW] (identifying judicial training and
resources as areas in need of improvement in New York family courts).
55 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 578-79 (“[D]ecision-making resources—such as . . . resources
for evidence gathering; the services of expert witnesses; [and] rapid response capability for high risk
cases—are far outmatched by the demand for case resolution.” (footnote omitted)); see also Jacquelyn
C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case
Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1093-96 tbl.2 (2003) (concluding that certain risk factors
exist and can be used as a proxy to identify “high risk” domestic abuse cases more likely to result in
death; such factors include incidents of prior abuse, abuser’s access to a gun, stalking, forced sex,
and abuse during pregnancy).
56 See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 577-78 (“One reason for the resource inadequacy is the
huge volume of cases in many jurisdictions, both in family law generally, and in civil protective order
proceedings in particular.”).
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the United States, an estimated five million domestic relations cases were
filed in 2008.57 Filings continue to increase but resources remain limited.58
As a result of the lack of resources, judges presiding over protection order
proceedings may favor efficiency over thoroughness.59 Hearings are generally
brief60 and discovery requests are often discouraged or even precluded.61
Thus, even to the extent that victims of domestic violence are provided
protections by the law and the opportunity to obtain PFAs, busy court
dockets, a lack of court resources, and a lack of judges often prevent those
victims from vindicating their rights.
2. Unrepresented Litigants
Many family court litigants are unrepresented, especially in protective
order and custody cases.62 In a survey conducted by the American Judicature
57 R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 14 (2012), http://
www.courtstatistics.org/other-pages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csp_dec.ashx [https://
perma.cc/X93Q-H86E]. “Domestic relations” cases are typically adjudicated in specialized family
court systems that operate as appendages of civil courts. In Philadelphia, domestic relations cases
are handled in the Family Division. Family Division, PHILA. CTS., http://courts.phila.gov/commonpleas/family/ [https://perma.cc/U8EP-36LD] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). The juvenile branch
involves juvenile court operations, juvenile probation, and adoption proceedings. Id. Domestic relations
matters involve paternity, support, custody, visitation, and divorce—and of most relevance, domestic
violence. Id.; see also PA. R. CIV. P. 1931(a) (enumerating the types of actions governed by Pennsylvania
family court’s procedural rules). More broadly, domestic relations cases are generally thought to include
divorce/dissolution, paternity, custody, support, visitation, adoption, and civil protection/restraining
order cases. See LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., supra, at 17 (listing the types of domestic relations cases).
58 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Progressive legislation has improved substantive
remedies available to domestic violence victims. See Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized
Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1291
(2000) (noting that 1990 legislation, which both criminalized domestic violence and provided victims
with greater remedies, marked a turning point in public discourse and perception of domestic
violence as a criminal transgression). Despite these substantive improvements, pragmatic
deficiencies often preclude abused parties from realizing them. See Freedman, supra note 17, at 578
(“[Protective order] case loads have expanded significantly in recent decades, but resources within
the family court system have not increased sufficiently to meet the need.”). Such deficiencies include,
“inadequate or no legal representation [for the abused]; overburdened, inexperienced or poorly
trained judges; and informal, rushed, often very brief legal hearings.” Id. at 568 n.1. In Philadelphia,
only two judges are assigned to handle all PFA petitions, which routinely total over 12,000 annual
filings. WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 54, at 10; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
59 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 584 (“Proceedings in which domestic violence issues are at
the forefront are especially likely to be mishandled.”).
60 See id. at 579 (“[I]n family law cases, proceedings are often brief.”).
61 Id. Discovery in civil protective order cases is generally difficult because of the short time
between the entrance of a temporary restraining order and the final restraining order hearing. See
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6107(a) (2016) (requiring a plaintiff to prove his or her allegations within ten
days of the filing of a petition). Many state rules permit discovery only upon a showing of “good
cause” and requests are rarely made or granted. See Freedman, supra note 17, at 579 n.35.
62 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Society and the State Justice Institute (AJS/SJI), 65.1% of all judges surveyed—
both from family courts and nonfamily courts—indicated that the number of
self-represented litigants in their courtrooms increased moderately or greatly
over the past five years.63 These statistics are only amplified in family courts;
pro se appearances are extremely common in domestic relations cases.64 One
explanation for this is that many low and moderate income litigants cannot
afford to hire a lawyer.65
The increasing number of self-represented litigants66 further burdens family
court systems. Pro se litigation presents due process concerns.67 Litigants who
appear in court without representation are substantially less likely to understand
legal proceedings than represented litigants.68 Self-represented litigants may
also fail to present their cases effectively because they struggle with legal
procedures, courtroom decorum, and rules of evidence.69 This lack of knowledge
translates to a lack of access to justice for litigants who cannot effectively
navigate the system without an attorney.70 This issue is exacerbated when a pro
se litigant faces a party who has counsel.71
Pro se appearances also complicate court processes and the roles of court
staff, administrators, and judges.72 Self-represented litigants often seek
assistance when filling out court forms and other documents, which takes

63 JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A
REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 117 (1998).
64 See, e.g., WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 54, at 48 tbl.8 (concluding that nearly 80% of
petitioners and 75% respondents in protection from abuse and custody cases proceeded without counsel).
65 Berenson, supra note 45, at 117.
66 See id. at 105 (“[T]he number of self-represented litigants continues to expand.”).
67 Unlike in the criminal realm, litigants in civil proceedings are not entitled to representation. See
supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. However, many argue that family court proceedings involve
constitutionally protected liberty interests. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (finding
a “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”).
68 See Berenson, supra note 45, at 115 (discussing the “difficulties of navigating complex,
confusing, and often convoluted legal procedures without the assistance of counsel”).
69 See id. (stating that judges realize that “self-represented parties’ unfamiliarity with legal
procedures or the rules of evidence may result in the denial of meritorious claims”).
70 See LeeAnn Iovanni & Susan L. Miller, Criminal Justice System Responses to Domestic Violence: Law
Enforcement and the Courts (reporting that victims not represented by counsel are less likely to receive
protective orders, or if they do, the orders are likely to lack needed provisions excluding the offender from
the residence and concerning child custody, visitation and child support), in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 303, 313-14 (Claire M. Renzetti et al. eds., 2001).
71 When this occurs, studies suggest that pro se litigants must not only navigate an unfamiliar
legal system but overcome a certain degree of perceived nepotism where an opposing counsel and
judge have a prior familiarity. See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 54, at 91 (“Some [litigants]
express concern about spousal relatives on court staff or their spouse’s attorney winning based on a
relationship with the judge, rather than the merits of the case.”).
72 See Berenson, supra note 45, at 112 (stating that pro se litigants place burdens on the court
system “that would not exist if all litigants were represented by lawyers,” such as increased time or
court resources needed to process cases).
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court personnel away from their other duties.73 As one judge responded to
the AJS/SJI survey, “self-represented litigants’ ‘lack of experience and
inability to understand elementary proceedings’ . . . caus[es] the prolonging
of proceedings [and] plac[es] ‘a great burden on the court.’”74 Thus, the high
percentage of unrepresented litigants in family court presents challenges both
to the courts and to the litigants themselves. Courts’ resources are scarce and
caseloads are high, while self-represented litigants have a more difficult time
obtaining the desired relief and often feel like the deck is stacked against them.
3. Challenging Subject Matter
Protection order proceedings involve a complex and often personal
subject matter.75 Domestic violence cases involve a range of circumstances,
including relationships characterized by dominance and control, incidents of
violence that may vary in significance depending on circumstances about
which little or no reliable evidence may be available, parties’ psychological
dysfunctions, and conflicts where both parties’ behavior arguably violates a
statute, but it is unclear whether either party is a danger to the other.76
In light of these complicated topics, factfinders tasked with deciding
whether to issue a protection order must weigh a host of concerns, such as
balancing competing social priorities.77 For example, where proceedings
involve custody disputes, promoting parent–child relationships often
conflicts with the need to protect children from physical and emotional

73 See id. at 113 (describing the disproportionate share of their “scarce time” that judges spend
“guiding self-represented litigants through the labyrinth of pre-trial and trial practice”).
74 GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 63, at 53.
75 See Tsai, supra note 58, at 1293 (noting that the complex matters in domestic violence involve
issues relating to family dynamics and emotional relationships that are not paralleled in other crimes).
76 For a discussion on the nuanced aspects of domestic violence cases, see Freedman, supra note
17, at 580-83. Freedman states that

[d]omestic violence issues typically include[] a variety of circumstances, including:
textbook examples of male dominance . . . ; specific incidents of violent or threatening
behavior by one or both parties . . . ; cases in which, in addition to evidence of domestic
violence, the non-violent partner seems to be suffering from serious personal dysfunctions
. . . ; cases in which the parties are engaged in intense conflict and both parties’ behavior
is arguably in violation of the civil protective order statute, but it is not clear whether either
party is dangerous.
Id. at 580-81. Despite this complex range of issues, lack of funding and other resources preclude
judges from dedicating sufficient time to such issues. See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra note 54,
at 59 tbl.9 (reporting that, of the observed proceedings in 2002, more than half of the PFA hearings
filed in Philadelphia were completed in five minutes or less).
77 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 584 (describing how courts might weigh the abuse of the
parent or child against other factors in determining custody).
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harm.78 Judges must also make important determinations that affect litigants’
personal lives through the limited lens of a single hearing.79 Ann Freedman
posits that judicial decisions made in light of testimony taken during a
protection order hearing “may have little or no relationship to the lived reality
of family life.”80 The complex subject matter of domestic violence cases thus
compounds the problems presented by crowded court dockets and the high
percentage of unrepresented litigants, which taken together may lead to
results that are not founded on the realities of the situation.
C. Courts’ Mishandling of Civil Domestic Violence Cases
Due in part to the challenges facing family courts, protection order
statutes have been left compromised and improperly enforced. Protective
order petitions that should be granted may be denied or inadequately
enforced when violated.81 Rather than pursue their PFA formally before the
court, victims may reach an agreement82 with their alleged abuser when
testifying could risk their safety or require more resources than are available
to them.83 Additionally, when proceedings involve children, their well-being
may be neglected.84 This may occur because a false claim of abuse succeeds
or, even more concerning, because abuse cannot be demonstrated to the

78 But see generally Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
657 (2003) (arguing that, despite concerns to protect children’s relationships with both parents,
domestic violence should be given decisive weight when making custody decisions).
79 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 581-82 (“The task of deciding which cases deserve legal
intervention . . . is extremely difficult even with time for reflection, which is generally not available.”).
80 Id. at 582.
81 For example, Philadelphia’s City Council has conducted hearings and heard testimony
regarding enforcement issues surrounding protective orders. See WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, supra
note 54, at 78. Testimony highlighted the administrative difficulty of enforcing orders confiscating
an abuser’s weapon, as only one sheriff was assigned to perform that task. Id. Batterers ordered to
attend anger management class may be disinclined to do so, because no adequate mechanism exists
to ensure compliance. Id. “While court judgments mark the end point of many legal disputes . . .
domestic violence . . . cases often require longer term judicial oversight and extended social services
. . . . [T]hese cases begin rather than end with a judge’s ruling.” Freedman, supra note 17, at 569.
82 The relief afforded by Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act can come by way of a
protection from abuse order or a consent agreement between the parties. 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6108(a) (2016) (“The court may grant any protection order or approve any consent agreement to
bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children.”). Because a consent order is by
agreement of the parties, any factfinding is rendered superfluous and thus victims are not required
to testify against their abuser in court.
83 See, e.g., Meier, supra note 78, at 664-65 (describing a child custody case in which a mother
gave up custody of her child to the abuser rather than continuing to litigate before a hostile judge).
84 See Freedman, supra note 17, at 581-82 (describing factors courts consider in these cases that
might conflict with the child’s safety, such as “encouraging cooperation between parents”).
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court’s satisfaction.85 In sum, protection order statutes currently do not serve
the single most important purpose underlying their enactment: to protect
domestic violence victims and decrease incidents of domestic violence.86
II. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:
A PARADIGM SHIFT
This Part discusses a recent paradigm shift within the legal community:
the comprehensive law movement. It focuses specifically on two alternative
approaches proposed by the movement: therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice. It details the foundational principles of both theories and
their growing popularity within the United States and internationally, and
highlights the benefits and drawbacks of each. Finally, this Part discusses the
similarities and differences between the two theories, and suggests that both
can be combined to further one holistic, therapeutic approach to legal
practice, which can then be applied to the civil protection order process.
A. The Comprehensive Law Movement
Over the last two decades, attorneys and scholars alike have expressed
dissatisfaction with traditional legal systems, particularly in family law.87
Specifically, critics assert that the complexities surrounding family law issues
are not adequately addressed by ordinary legal means.88 As a result,
alternative forms of law practice have emerged in an effort to incorporate
interdisciplinary approaches into historically adversarial paradigms.89 A
number of these approaches are rapidly gaining popularity, including
85 See id. at 584 (discussing the problem of false claims and skeptical courts with “limited
fact-finding resources”).
86 The current system’s failures to protect domestic violence victims are not limited to the
courts. For example, in 2011, nearly one in ten emergency calls to the Philadelphia Police
Department for assistance were determined by the dispatcher to be domestic violence related, and
of these, the response time was sixteen minutes. Sorenson, supra note 45, at 9.
87 See Marsha B. Freeman, Comparing Philosophies and Practices of Family Law Between the United
States and Other Nations: The Flinstones vs. The Jetsons, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 249, 254 (2010) (“There is
no dearth of voices in the United States today advocating the use of collaborative and therapeutic
jurisprudential philosophies and methodologies in a multitude of family law issues.”). See generally
Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive Law Movement,” 6 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 1 (2006) (comparing the integrative practice “vectors” that characterize the
comprehensive law approach with the dominant traditional lawyering model).
88 See, e.g., Daicoff, supra note 87, at 24 (discussing the “concrete processes” that emerge from
more therapeutic approaches to family law and highlighting that the comprehensive process vector
of “collaborative law” emerged from a search for a less emotionally damaging and more economical
way to resolve divorce cases).
89 See id. at 8 (“Because of the emotional devastation that can result from traditional adversarial
litigation, many of the vectors explicitly seek non-litigious solutions to legal problems . . . . Many
utilize collborative methods in solving legal problems.” (footnotes omitted)).

2016]

Protecting, Restoring, Improving

1571

collaborative law, creative problem solving, holistic justice, preventive law,
problem solving courts, procedural justice, restorative justice, therapeutic
jurisprudence, and transformative mediation.90 Together, they represent “the
comprehensive law movement.”91
Although individual approaches vary, the comprehensive law movement
generally seeks to advance two common goals: (1) maximizing the emotional,
psychological, and relational well-being of individuals and communities
involved in legal proceedings, and (2) focusing on concerns outside of strict
legal rights, responsibilities, duties, obligations, and entitlements.92 Many
approaches seek nonlitigious solutions to legal problems and instead utilize
collaborative and therapeutic methods to achieve legal objectives. This Essay
focuses specifically on two related theories within the comprehensive
movement—therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice—and their
potential effect on protection order proceedings.
1. Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Therapeutic jurisprudence is “the study of the role of the law as a
therapeutic agent . . . .”93 It involves the use of various social sciences to
90
91

Id. at 1-2.
Although it lacks a precise definition, the term “comprehensive law movement” first appeared
in 2000. Daicoff, supra note 87, at 3. The term now appears throughout recent literature. See, e.g., James
Coben & Penelope Harley, Intentional Conversations about Restorative Justice, Mediation and the Practice of
Law, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235, 260 (2004) (“The lawyer as a healer is part of a wider
evoluation in practice approaches collectively labeled the comprehensive or transformational law
movement . . . .”); Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133,
135 (2004) (“One of the key attributes of this comprehensive law movement is its interdisciplinary
approach.”); Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Lawyer Heal Thy Self: Incorporating Mindfulness into Legal Education
& Profession, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 23 (2015) (“Today, many law schools, bar associations, and legal
practitioners have endorsed the training and joined the Comphrehensive Law movement. . . .”); Pauline
H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 333 (2004) (“Susan Daicoff sees
collaborative law as one of a variety of ‘vectors’ in what she calls the ‘comprehensive law’ movement
. . . .”); David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 TOURO L. REV. 353, 353 (2004) (“What I would like
to do is talk a little bit about therapeutic jurisprudence and its relationship to the bulk of the other
vectors in the comprehensive law movement.”). See generally Susan Swaim Daicoff, Families in Circle
Process: Resorative Justice in Family Law, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 427 (2015) (explaining the use of the “circle
process” within the broader context of the “comprehensive law movement”).
92 See Daicoff, supra note 87, at 4 (“[The movement] values the law’s potential as an agent of
positive interpersonal and individual change . . . [and] integrates . . . extralegal concerns . . . into
law and legal practice.”).
93 David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 17, 18 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991). Wexler and Winnick were
the first to formalize the application of therapeutic jurisprudence and continue to promote
therapeutic jurisprudence and advocate for its incorporation into the traditional courtroom setting.
BRUCE J. WINICK & DAVID B. WEXLER, Introduction to JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 3, 3-7 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick
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determine “the extent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the
psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects.”94 Rather than
defining law as a set of formal principles, therapeutic jurisprudence regards
law as a “social force that produces behaviours and consequences.”95 It aims
to achieve positive therapeutic consequences and eliminate or minimize
antitherapeutic consequences for all parties involved, all else being equal.96
Often regarded as an academic discipline, therapeutic jurisprudence serves
as a “lens or perspective” through which other alternative forms of law practice
may be viewed.97 Its principles inform other aspects of the comprehensive law
movement, including restorative justice practices.98 Therapeutic jurisprudence
thus serves as a foundational or supplemental aspect of alternative approaches.99
First applied to mental health law in the 1990s, therapeutic jurisprudence
has since influenced several other legal fields, including workers’ compensation
law, sexual orientation law, disability law, fault-based tort compensation
schemes, contract law, and family law.100 While therapeutic jurisprudence has
been adopted in both the United States and Canada, it is far more widely
practiced in Canada, especially in family law.101 For example, in a majority of
eds., 2003) (highlighting a new style of court that is equipped to handle interdisciplinary problems
to advocate for a more therapeutic approach).
94 Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y. & L. 193, 196 (1995). For a discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence principles in practice, see
generally Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law: A
Combined Concentration to Invigorate the Everyday Practice of Law, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 25 (1997).
95 Valmaine Toki, Domestic Violence and Women: Can a Therapeutic Approach Assist?, 78 REVISTA
JURÍDICA UPR 61, 69 (2009).
96 Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 184, 188 (1997).
97 See Wexler, supra note 91, at 357 (“[T]his lens or perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence has
become an active partner of many . . . practical [legal] processes . . . .”).
98 See infra Section II.A.2.
99 See Wexler, supra note 91, at 357-58 (noting that research motivated by therapeutic
jurisprudence undergirds both the comparative law movement and practical professional innovations,
yielding “new and effective legal arrangements”).
100 See Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law in Child Welfare Proceedings:
A Family Systems Approach, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 951, 953 (1999) (“Child welfare proceedings
exhibit a number of characteristics that make them particularly well-suited for the application of
[therapeutic jurisprudence] . . . .”); Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence
Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33 (2000) (applying therapeutic jurisprudence to the processing of domestic
violence cases); see also Dennis P. Stolle et al., Integrating Preventative Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 18 (1997) (“Although the
approach originated in the area of mental health law, it has quickly expanded beyond that context, and
has become a mental health law approach to law generally . . . . [T]he therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective has recently been applied in the contexts of criminal law, family law, juvenile law, disability
law, discrimination law, health law, evidence law, tort law, contracts and commercial law, labor
arbitration, workers’ compensation law, probate law, and legal profession.”).
101 See Freeman, supra note 87, at 256-57 (noting that in the United States, acceptance of
therapeutic jurisprudence is primarily theoretical, while it is widely practiced in Canada).
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Canadian family law cases, “family circles, or conferences, replace court
procedures entirely to resolve the family law issues at hand in a far more
collaborative method.”102 Canadian courts applying therapeutic justice forego
traditional trial and sentencing techniques103 and instead engage in family
conferencing to achieve a more therapeutic result.104
2. Restorative Justice
a. Restorative Justice Defined
“Restorative justice” is the “process of bringing together the individuals who
have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the
harm caused by the crime.”105 Restorative justice practices focus not only on the
crime itself, but also on “the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the
future.”106 It seeks to “restore victims, restore offenders, and restore communities
in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just.”107 It places victims, offenders, and
communities “in active roles to work together to . . . [e]mpower victims in their
search for closure[,] [i]mpress upon offenders the real human impact of their
behavior[, and p]romote restitution to victims and communities.”108

102 Id.
103 See, e.g., NAT’L JUDICIAL INST., PROBLEM-SOLVING IN CANADA’S COURTROOMS: A
GUIDE TO THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE 7-19 (2011) (discussing Canadian courts’ application of

restorative justice principles in domestic violence matters).
104 See Freeman, supra note 87, at 255-56 (“[I]n Canada . . . traditional trial and sentencing
techniques are generally replaced by collaborative family conferencing in an effort to effectuate
results that take into account the needs of all and attempts to best arrive at a satisfactory solution.”).
Stu Webb, who also writes extensively on restorative justice concepts, highlighted the success of
therapeutic jurisprudence and collaborative methods in a small area of Canada and noted that in a
community of about 50,000, 16 of the 17 family practitioners attended collaborative trainings; within
a year, the family court docket had decreased significantly, and one family court judge was actually
reassigned to a different court. Stu Webb, Note, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Its
History and Current Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 155, 164 (2008).
105 John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) [hereinafter Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized].
106 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 5 (1999) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Restorative Justice].
107 Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized, supra note 105, at 1743.
108 MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., CTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & PEACEMAKING,
DIRECTORY OF VICTIM–OFFENDER MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, at vii
(2000); see also J. KIM WRIGHT, LAWYERS AS PEACEMAKERS: PRACTICING HOLISTIC, PROBLEMSOLVING LAW 323 (2010) (explaining that the goal of restorative justice is solving problems for the
future rather than assigning blame for the past).
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Primarily utilized in the criminal law context, restorative justice has
become increasingly popular in Canada,109 Australia,110 the United
Kingdom,111 and Japan.112 In some countries, it has even replaced traditional
forms of criminal law proceedings.113 However, the use of restorative justice
in the United States remains relatively limited.114 Given the United States’
focus on preserving constitutional rights and procedural due process,
restorative justice has been utilized “as an enhancement, rather than as a
substitute for existing criminal law procedures.”115
b. Restorative Justice Processes
In practice, restorative justice typically involves a collaborative process
akin to victim–offender mediation.116 The victim, the offender, and, if
appropriate, other members of the community, meet to participate in some
109 See Susan Daicoff, Collaborative Law: A New Tool for the Lawyer’s Toolkit, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 113, 118 (2009) (“Collaborative law is now found in most metropolitan areas in . . . Canada.”).
110 See generally, e.g., Lisbeth T. Pike & Paul T. Murphy, The Columbus Pilot in the Family Court
of Western Australia, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 270 (2006). The Columbus Program seeks to assist divorced
or separated parents in conflict resolution and was designed as an early intervention tool for complex
cases, especially those involving multiple allegations of abuse and violence. Id. at 270-71. It succeeded
the Magellan Project, another Australian program, which sought to manage high conflict, abusive
relationships through therapeutic methodologies. Id.
111 See Anna Bawden, How Restorative Justice Is Steering Young Offenders Away from Crime,
GUARDIAN (London) (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/sep/17/restorativejustice-young-offenders-crime [https://perma.cc/YUN5-J23L] (describing the growth of restorative
justice in addressing youth crime in England).
112 See generally John O. Haley, Crime Prevention Through Restorative Justice: Lessons from Japan
(describing the robust use of confession apology and forgiveness in the Japanese
criminal justice system), in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 349 (Burt
Galaway and Joe Hudson, eds., 1996).
113 See generally Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell, Restorative Justice in New Zealand,
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE
PARADIGMS? 257 (2003).
114 Practitioners have made only limited attempts to institute restorative justice principles in
resolving domestic violence cases. See James Ptacek, Evaluation Research on Restorative Justice and
Intimate Partner Violence: A Review and Critique 7 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://uknowledge.
uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=ipv [https://perma.cc/6P2J-QDES] (noting that the
restorative justice approaches to domestic violence are prohibited in many jurisdictions). Perhaps the most
comprehensive attempt to do so was spearheaded by Joan Pennell and Galle Burford, whose “family
group” decisionmaking model aimed “to eliminate or reduce violence against . . . adult family members
and to promote their well-being.” Id. at 8. Under this model, a conference facilitator oversees a
collaborative process between the abuser, abused, and impacted community members. Id. at 9. All
participants prepare beforehand for the family conference; once there, families create a plan to end the
abuse after receiving input from community agencies. Id. at 8-9. The facilitator, with the consultation
and approval of legal officials, must approve the plan. Id. at 9. Pennell and Burford found that families
submitting their case to the conferencing process, unlike the comparison group who did not, saw abuser
maltreatment decrease by half. Id.
115 Daicoff, supra note 87, at 31.
116 Id. at 30.
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form of adjudication or sentencing.117 The meeting is led by a facilitator and
usually resembles a conference.118 The process involves a discussion of the crime
and its consequences.119 The victim and the offender each have an opportunity
to address each other; the victim may explain how the crime affected him or
her and the offender has the opportunity take responsibility for his or her
actions.120 The participants then develop a plan to “heal” the crime’s negative
effects on the victim and the community, including the possible ways that the
offender can make reparations.121 The conference usually concludes with all
parties agreeing on a settlement or a solution.122
Restorative justice differs from criminal justice in both theory and practice.
First, it promotes direct communication between victims and offenders.123 This
element, which is noticeably absent in traditional criminal proceedings, allows
for the possibility of negotiation, understanding, confession, reconciliation, and
forgiveness.124 Additionally, unlike a criminal sentencing, the underlying goal of
restorative justice is not punitive.125 Instead, it gives the offender the opportunity
to repair harm.126 In turn, victims and communities have the ability to confront
offenders and hold them accountable for their actions in a productive manner.127

117
118
119

Id. at 31.
Id.
See id. at 32 (detailing the practice of restorative justice in some adult criminal settings, including
a discussion of the crime in which the victim may ask questions and express feelings about it).
120 See, e.g., id. (using the story of a drunk driver and his victim to illustrate the practice of
openly discussing the offense).
121 See, e.g., id. (illustrating that restorative justice allowed a victim to express the best way for
the offender to make amends).
122 See, e.g., id. (describing the solution reached by restorative justice participants in which the
offender promised to speak to the victim’s children and the victim agreed to join the offender in an
outreach campaign against the crime at issue, drunk driving); see also NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FACILITATOR INDUCTION TRAINING 19-22 (2009) (detailing the
procedures for conducting a restorative justice conference).
123 See Mark S. Umbreit & Robert B. Coates, Cross-Site Analysis of Victim–Offender Mediation in
Four States, 39 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 565, 572 (1993) (describing the victim–offender mediation
process within the restorative justice framework, which requires both parties to meet and may put the
offender in “the often uncomfortable position of having to face the person they victimized”).
124 See id. at 575 (explaining that nine out of ten victims and offenders were satisfied with the
outcome of the victim–offender mediation sessions in the study presented, which typically
concluded with a restitution agreement).
125 See Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized, supra note 105, at 1743 (“One
value of restorative justice is that we should be reluctant to resort to punishment.”).
126 See Daicoff, supra note 87, at 30 (explaining that restorative justice aims to repair the
relationship between the offender and both the victim and the community).
127 See id. at 31 (highlighting that the purpose behind restorative justice is to focus on
restitution and rehabilitating the offender rather than merely imposing punishment).
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c. Restorative Justice Outcomes
Restorative justice advocates cite several benefits to its processes. Most
noticeably, participant satisfaction has been recorded as between 90% and 95%.128
Participants’ perceptions of fairness are significantly higher in restorative justices
processes than in traditional legal proceedings.129 Additionally, studies indicate
that restorative justice practices decrease recidivism more effectively than other
forms of punishment.130 Finally, restorative justice practices may be less expensive
than other legal proceedings and a less expensive punishment than incarceration.131
Despite its purported success, rebuttals abound. Skeptics argue that
restorative justice’s focus on rehabilitating offenders overshadows victims’
needs.132 Others allege that restorative justice forces victims to assist with
offenders’ rehabilitation.133 Restorative justice practices have also been criticized
128 Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized, supra note 105, at 1744. Restorative
justice principles yield this result because of the emphasis placed on resolving disputes in the way most
effective to meet each party’s needs. See Susan Swaim Daicoff, Families in Circle Process: Restorative
Justice in Family Law, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 427, 430 (2015) (describing a particular restorative justice
practice—the circle process—which aims to bring all stakeholder voices together to find mutually
beneficial outcomes). This approach may provide the victim a forum, otherwise unavailable via
traditional legal avenues, “in which to address complex situations in a deep and meaningful way.” Id.;
see also Kate E. Bloch, Reconceptualizing Restorative Justice, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 201, 208
(2010) (explaining that research supports concluding that restorative justice is effective “in increasing
offender/victim satisfaction and restitution compliance, and decreasing offender recidivism”).
129 See Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, supra note 106, at 26 (citing studies which found that
offenders perceived their criminal justice proceedings as fair in 89% of cases that utilized restorative
justice mediations compared with 78% of cases that did not).
130 See Bloch, supra note 128, at 207-08 (describing a study that found that restorative justice
programs reduce offender recidivism rates). While restorative justice practices encourage offenders
to accept responsibility for the crime and its consequences, criminal proceedings may force offenders
to deny responsibility, which has been shown to increase recidivism. See Braithwaite, Restorative
Justice, supra note 106, at 48 (“The restorative process, by showing a path to redemption, provides
an alternative to denial. This contrasts with the two paths the court proffers—guilt and punishment
or innocence and impunity—a choice that makes denial an attractive possibility.”). Scholars have
also called for incorporating therapeutic elements into family law. See, e.g., LINDA D. ELROD,
CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:16, Westlaw (database updated June 2015)
(arguing that restorative justice can be used in the family law context to “empower[] victims in their
search for closure, impress[] upon offenders the real human impact of their behavior, and promote[]
restitution to victims and communities”).
131 See Braithwaite, Restorative Justice, supra note 106, at 70-71 (citing evidence that restorative
justice processes have led to cost savings, particularly through the closing of juvenile institutions,
but also admitting that studies on cost-effectiveness have limitations).
132 See, e.g., Harry Mika et al., Listening to Victims—A Critique of Restorative Justice Policy and
Practice in the United States, 68 FED. PROB., June 2004, at 32, 33 (claiming that restorative justice
processes not only considers the offender’s needs but are driven by those needs, which may not be
compatible with the victim’s interests).
133 In the domestic violence context, critics of restorative justice are primarily concerned that its
informal practices fail to implement safety mechanisms to address the dangers its forum poses for
survivors. See, e.g., James Ptacek & Loretta Frederick, Restorative Justice and Intimate Partner Violence,
NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2009), http://www.vawnet.org/domestic-
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for setting “unrealistic or unreasonable goals.”134 Victims could experience harm
again in circumstances where offenders do not meet expectations or do not truly
engage in the process.135 While restorative justice is not universally accepted, the
next Section argues that therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice, if used
in conjunction, would present a dramatic improvement from the current
American system of handling accusations of domestic violence.
B. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Restorative Justice as Counterparts
Although therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice operate as two
distinct legal theories, they share common foundational principles: both have
a practical dimension—they are not merely analytical frameworks, but also
propose actual ways to practice—and both serve a therapeutic purpose by
emphasizing emotions, empathy, healing, and individuals’ psychological
well-being.136 Moreover, each retains elements of traditional theories of
justice, while emphasizing problemsolving rather than punishment.137
Therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice also diverge in certain key
respects, however.138 For example, most therapeutic jurisprudence proponents
do not support “shaming,” a concept that often accompanies restorative justice
practices.139 Restorative justice also retains a broader scope than therapeutic
jurisprudence.140 While therapeutic jurisprudence maintains a primarily
theoretical focus, restorative justice incorporates specific practices and an

violence/print-document.php?doc_id=1656&find_type=web_desc_AR [https://perma.cc/A43Z-LTPB]
(acknowledging the criticism that “existing restorative justice models . . . fail[] to adequately address
issues of safety and accountability”). Critics also argue that restorative justice processes may minimize
the victim’s harm—especially given the potential to mislabel the parties as a “problem couple”—as
opposed to recognizing it and the abuser–abused dynamic. Id. Other critics fear that participating in
restorative justice while intimate partner violence is ongoing will pressure victims into taking
responsibility for rehabilitating their partners and deprioritize their own victimization. Id.
134 Mika et al., supra note 132, at 33.
135 See id. (“[W]here offenders are not sorry for what they have done, victims may feel harmed
again for this failure of justice.”).
136 James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice,
40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1546 (2003).
137 Id.
138 See id. at 1547 (noting that the two theories differ in some respects).
139 Compare Victoria Pynchon, Shame by Any Other Name: Lessons for Restorative Justice from the
Principles, Traditions and Practices of Alcoholics Anonymous, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 299, 300-01
(2005) (discussing the origins of the theory of “reintegrative shaming,” which, when put into
practice, involves holding conferences with offenders, victims, and their families and friends to
condemn the crime while forgiving the offender), with Nolan, supra note 136, at 1548 (explaining
Bruce Winick’s belief that “shaming” is “unfortunate”).
140 See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL.
244, 247 (2002) (noting that restorative justice is “concerned with a much wider net of consequences”
than therapeutic justice).
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identified set of process-oriented values.141 In spite of these differences,
therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice together can combine to create
a more holistic approach to legal practice.142
III. OPPOSITION TO ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION
Most arguments against adopting alternative approaches to civil protection
order proceedings stem from a supposed theoretical disconnect between the
traditional civil response to domestic violence and newer, more therapeutic
frameworks. Critics argue that therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice
principles conflict with traditional theories behind domestic violence
intervention. Private reconciliation opportunities, victim–offender collaboration,
and community involvement are central to therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice, but these ideas remain foreign to traditional responses and are
antithetical to traditional theoretical frameworks.
A. Private Reconciliations
The law has largely abandoned domestic violence interventions that
enable private reconciliation.143 Before the advent of civil protection order
statutes, the criminal justice system encouraged victims to reconcile with
their abusers outside traditional legal proceedings.144 However, anti–domestic
violence advocates claimed that this response “failed to acknowledge the
severity of domestic violence and put victims at serious risk” of future
harm.145 Contemporary approaches reflect these concerns by urging active

141 See id. at 247-51 (identifying the “process ideal” that characterizes restorative justice and
delineating three groups of restorative values).
142 Good Shepherd Mediation Program, which originated in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
provides a useful example of therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice principles working in
tandem. Good Shepherd offers four types of mediation programs: (1) community group
conferencing, (2) victim–offender conferencing, (3) circles, and (4) family group decisionmaking.
About Good Shepherd Mediation Program, GOOD SHEPHERD MEDIATION PROGRAM,
http://www.phillymediators.org/about-gsmp [https://perma.cc/E2ZZ-ZQWH] (last visited Apr. 15,
2016). Thus, although Good Shepherd Mediation models its programs after restorative justice
practices, elements of therapeutic jurisprudence underlie the program’s mission.
143 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 542 (discussing how the “movement against domestic violence”
has moved away from “responses that urge private reconciliation between the parties”).
144 See Brian R. Decker, Violence and the Private: A Girardian Model of Domestic Violence in
Society, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 105, 109-10 (2007–2008) (stating that even in the twentieth
century, because domestic violence was traditionally considered a private family matter, police
responses remained limited to attempts to reconcile the parties).
145 Kohn, supra note 2, at 542.
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state involvement.146 However, therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative
justice practices contradict this basic tenet of domestic violence intervention by
instead supporting private reconciliations outside traditional justice systems.
B. Victim–Offender Collaboration
Critics also assert that victim–offender collaboration in alternative domestic
violence interventions contradicts traditional domestic violence intervention
theory. Domestic violence studies indicate that abusers exert power and control
over victims through coercive interactions.147 For example, a 2009 study
demonstrated “the inability of domestic violence victims to bargain effectively
with their abusers” during legal interventions.148 Therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice practices, which rely on a survivor’s meaningful participation,
may be rendered ineffective if the victim cannot freely express emotions or
remains in fear of the abuser.149 Some critics believe that coming to a mutual
agreement or solution—a vital aspect of both therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice—remains an impossibility where the “imbalance in power
negates [the] victim’s ability to negotiate” with the offender.150
Similarly, the possibility of apologies and forgiveness during victim–offender
collaborations are central to the restorative justice paradigm. However, these two
values may contribute to a continuing cycle of violence between abusers and their
victims.151 Between violent episodes, an offender may apologize and promise
cessation of violence in an effort to maintain the relationship and retain the status
quo.152 A survivor’s acceptance of an apology may also lead to further harm.
Indeed, a victim may accept an offender’s apology and grant forgiveness when
the victim’s acceptance is neither fully voluntary nor healing for the victim.153 In
146 See id. (“[C]ontemporary responses to domestic violence involve active state
engagement.”).
147 See, e.g., Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1121-22 (2009) (arguing that an abuser’s use of
power and control deprives the victim of liberty and defines the victim’s experience as much as the
abuser’s physical violence).
148 Kohn, supra note 2, at 543 (citing Ruth Busch, Domestic Violence and Restorative Justice
Initiatives: Who Pays if We Get It Wrong?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 223,
223-34, 230 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2002)).
149 See id. at 543 (noting that an “intervention that relies on the meaningful participation” of an
empowered, uncoerced victim can be highly problematic in the context of domestic violence disputes).
150 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Susan S. Russell, Using Restorative Justice in Family
Violence Situations, 4 CRIME VICTIMS REP. 65, 75 (2000)).
151 See id. at 546 (discussing the role of the abuser’s apologies and promises to reform in
maintaining the relationship and perpetuating the cycle of domestic violence, noting that they are
“fraught with danger and complexity”).
152 See id. (noting theories that suggest apologies “frequently serve as the glue that holds
together a cycle of violence”).
153 Id.
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one study, victims admitted that even when they wanted to reject their abuser’s
apology, they rarely did so.154 These complexities only increase concerns
regarding victim–offender collaborations.
C. Community Involvement
Community involvement in therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice
practices may contradict the traditional role of the community in domestic
violence cases.155 In addition to accessing “both the shaming and nurturing
influences of community in resolving conflict,” restorative justice needs
community support to provide both parties with a peaceful environment.156
However, critics argue that certain communities “may not be willing or able
to fulfill [their] responsibilities” in domestic violence cases for two reasons.157
First, victims may become isolated from friends and family as a result of
continuing abuse and may lack meaningful community connections.158 Second,
family and community ties might fail to denounce domestic violence and
instead perpetuate harm.159 Communities may continue to believe “folk
wisdom” and “myths about the causes of and treatment for domestic
violence.”160 These belief sets can result in “victim blaming and minimization
of abuse.”161 Given these concerns, critics argue that community involvement
may result in more harm than good.162

154 See Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, “I’ve Said I’m Sorry, Haven’t I?” A Study of the
Identity Implications and Constraints That Apologies Create for Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT PSYCHOL.
10, 19 (1994) (reporting that subjects in the study were “extremely unlikely to indicate that they
would reject an apology”).
155 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 546 (noting that the emphasis on community involvement
contravenes the “role community has traditionally played in domestic violence interventions”).
156 Id. at 546-47 (citation omitted).
157 Id. at 547.
158 Id.; see also Ruth Jones, Guardianship for Coercively Controlled Battered Women: Breaking the
Control of the Abuser, 88 GEO. L.J. 605, 616-17 (2000) (“The batterer isolates the woman from friends,
family, colleagues, and neighbors in an effort to maintain control. The battered woman may also
choose to isolate herself from others in order to avoid embarrassment.” (citation omitted)).
159 See Ruth Lewis et al., Law’s Progressive Potential: The Value of Engagement with the Law for
Domestic Violence, 10 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 105, 119 (2001) (noting research that suggests that
battered women often live in communities that “simply reinforce[] and support[] traditional forms
of patriarchal power”).
160 Kohn, supra note 2, at 548 (citation omitted); see also id. (“Community norms often tolerate or
even support a certain level of domestic chastisement. In addition, community members might prefer
that domestic violence remain a private matter and refuse to become involved.”(citation omitted)).
161 See id. (noting that restorative justice practitioners “must recognize the complicit role the
community can play by its either ignoring or condoning domestic violence”).
162 See id. (“A central theoretical reliance on positive community influence . . . might prove
incompatible with the reality of domestic violence.”).
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IV. REFRAMING “JUSTICE” IN PROTECTION ORDER PROCEEDINGS
Despite the legitimate concerns behind incorporating therapeutic approaches
into domestic violence intervention, litigants involved in protection order
proceedings would benefit from a combination of therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice practices. Many of the concerns outlined in Part III can be
alleviated and, despite their different approaches, there are common goals among
therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice, and the current civil domestic
violence response. Incorporating therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative
justice concepts into the existing civil protective system would address the
system’s shortcomings and substantially improve litigants’ access to justice.
A. Overcoming Criticisms: Why Therapeutic Approaches Prevail
The critiques outlined in Part III of this Article raise significant concerns
about the incorporation of alternative justice paradigms into civil domestic
violence cases. This Section suggests that these critiques should serve as
navigational tools, rather than roadblocks, in implementing alterative approaches
to domestic violence in protection order proceedings.
First, concerns related to victim participation in alternative dispute resolution
processes are mitigated by the voluntary nature of participating in therapeutic
jurisprudence and restorative justice practices.163 Affording a victim the
opportunity to choose among several options for resolution not only affords a sense
of autonomy, but also recognizes each victim’s individual needs. Indeed, rather than
being forced to proceed in court, a victim may choose to engage in a therapeutic or
restorative resolution tailored to his or her individual level of comfort.164
Second, more specific theoretical critiques, such as the potential dangers
of collaboration among victims and offenders, are also misplaced. Critics
argue that therapeutic and restorative justice concepts have adverse effects on
domestic violence interventions because they place victims at an increased
risk of coercion.165 However, current domestic violence theories suggest that
a portion—possibly even the majority—of violent relationships stem from
“situational couple violence,” where violence is linked to the escalation of

163 See C. Quince Hopkins, Tempering Idealism with Realism: Using Restorative Justice Processes to
Promote Acceptance of Responsibility in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 311,
341 (2012) (stating that any process that does not honor or place the wishes of the victim at its center
is “not truly a restorative justice approach”).
164 See id. at 322 (stating that the criminal process “often fail[s] to address the victims’ physical
and emotional safety needs” and that it “may force victims to move more quickly . . . than is
psychologically advisable”).
165 See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
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specific conflicts rather than control.166 Domestic violence affects a diverse
set of relationships, some less intimate than others.167 In cases where the
parties have relatively little history between them or lack complex
relationship dynamics, collaboration may not only be appropriate but may
also be more effective than traditional protection order proceedings.168
Further, in cases where survivors remain with their partners,169 efforts to
facilitate collaboration may also “assist in securing the victim’s safety.”170
B. Common Ground Shared by Current and Alternative Approaches
Despite their procedural differences, traditional civil responses to domestic
violence and alternative justice paradigms share many common goals. At the
broadest level, civil protection order statutes aim to provide domestic violence
survivors with a more comprehensive, more flexible range of relief than is
available in the criminal justice system.171 Therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice principles promote these same goals.172 Indeed, where a
survivor maintains a relationship or frequent contact with an abuser, therapeutic
alternatives may even exceed the goals advanced by the current civil approach.173

166 Michael P. Johnson, Domestic Violence: It’s Not About Gender—Or Is It?, 67 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1126, 1127 (2005). It is important to note that alternative approaches such as therapeutic
jurisprudence and restorative justice may be most appropriate when limited to these scenarios, and
where control issues do not predominate. See Ptacek, supra note 114, at 12 (describing how certain cases
of intimate partner violence are not suited for mediation, including “where the domination of the male
partner is demonstrated, ascertained, and defended by the use of physical violence” (citation omitted)).
167 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 556 (discussing some of the less intimate relationships nonetheless
covered under domestic violence protection statutes, including “those who share a common partner,
or strangers who stalk or are being stalked”).
168 Cf. id. (positing that less complicated relationships may not “merit restorative justice
intervention” precisely because of “their lack of complexity”).
169 See Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to
Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 512 (2003) (finding that 17.3%
of women in their study were planning “to continue an intimate relationship with their batterer”
and that 39.3% were planning to “at least remain in contact with their abusers in the future”).
170 Kohn, supra note 2, at 556.
171 See id. at 553 (noting that one of the goals in adopting protection order statutes was to make
“broader and more flexible relief ” available to survivors).
172 See id. (arguing that restorative justice programs “may enhance the attainment” of the goals
underlying civil protection order statutes).
173 See, e.g., ALAN EDWARDS & SUSAN SHARPE, MEDIATION & RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
CTR., RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LITERATURE
REVIEW 6 (2004), https://s3.amazonaws.com/mrjc/restorative_justice_DV_Lit_Review.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6LTK-K33P] (reporting that the results of a South African restorative justice study
implementing victim–offender mediation demonstrated that “[w]here couples had stayed together,
the women reported improved communication and a reduction in verbal abuse”); see also Ptacek,
supra note 114, at 9 (reporting on a study which found that when children are involved in the
restorative justice process, extended family feels more compelled to intervene to end the abuse).
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First, both traditional and alternative approaches aim to promote victim
safety.174 Although restorative justice advocates emphasize healing, they also
uniformly measure recidivism and reabuse rates, which are then incorported into
program effectiveness analyses.175 Second, just as protection order proceedings
provide survivors with an avenue through which they may be heard, therapeutic
alternatives also offer a forum for survivors to express themselves.176 In fact,
many survivors may find speaking informally in a conference setting to be “less
daunting than [testifying in] the courtroom.”177 Finally, both traditional
protection order proceedings and alternative paradigms attempt to incorporate
a holistic approach to domestic violence intervention, one which “address[es]
complex situations in a deep and meaningful way.”178 Finally, protection order
statutes provide additional relief to survivors by making available family law and
social service remedies.179 Similarly, therapeutic approaches allow parties to craft
specific resolutions to meet their needs.180
C. Coming to an Agreement: Therapeutic Alternatives as a Supplement to
Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act
Considering alternative approaches as a supplement to, rather than a
replacement for, the current civil justice system may help to alleviate lingering
concerns about the role restorative justice practices may play in Pennsylvania.181
This Essay suggests a gradual, voluntary introduction of alternative legal
paradigms into preexisting civil justice systems. Therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice principles already have a place in most civil domestic violence
statutes.182 For instance, Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act could
incorporate alternative justice approaches into the current system with minimal
effort, yet those minor changes could have a dramatic impact on the lives of
domestic abuse victims.
174 See Kohn, supra note 2, at 526-27 (surveying studies on the effectiveness of traditional and
alternative approaches at increasing victim safety).
175 See, e.g., Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Family Group Decision Making: Protecting Children and
Women, 79 CHILD WELFARE 131, 145-47 (2000) (highlighting that participants in family group
decisionmaking therapies report greater interfamilial safety).
176 See supra Section II.A.
177 Kohn, supra note 2, at 554.
178 Id.
179 See id. (discussing how protection order statutes “have expanded the scope of relief . . . to
include family law and social service remedies”).
180 See id. at 555 (reflecting on how therapeutic programs “create time and space” for the parties
to reach resolutions particular to the parties’ needs).
181 Indeed, an optimal approach views restorative justice and the current legal paradigm as
symbiotic, rather than mutually exclusive, and any restorative process would be an optional
alternative to current programs. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 2, at 554-55 (pointing out a District of Columbia statute affording
the judge the power to “grant any relief that is ‘appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter’”).
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Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act allows for orders by agreement.183
Excluding cases where the petitioner did not appear or withdrew the PFA
petition, almost half of Philadelphia’s remaining PFA adjudications resulted in
an agreement between the parties.184 However, the word “agreement” should be
understood loosely in this context. An agreement between the parties does not
necessarily require that the litigants actually speak directly to one another.
Instead, litigants may communicate through their attorneys, or, in cases where
the litigants are unrepresented, through court staff or even the presiding judge.
As a result, agreements may be made without any real discussion between the
parties regarding what precipitated the initial filing. This is problematic for two
reasons. First, petitioners may agree to less protection than they actually need.
Second, respondents may not understand what exactly they are agreeing to, or,
more fundamentally, the lasting consequences of their actions.
Therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice principles stand as a viable
way to address these problems. If a victim chooses to negotiate an order by
agreement with the abuser, the incorporation of a restorative justice regime into
the ensuing negotiation process would ensure an equitable bargaining dynamic,
and, ultimately a more equitable result—assurances that are otherwise absent
from the way in which parties currently bargain for an order by agreement.185
While in theory this concept seems ideal, implementation does remain a
problem. Most case studies examining the efficacy of therapeutic jurisprudence
and restorative justice involved abused parties who participated on a volunteer
basis.186 Further, states have been reluctant to incorporate a sanctioned mediation
system that uses restorative justice practices and therapeutic jurisprudence ideals
into their PFA proceedings.187 However, states can implement this process on a
volunteer basis, as was the usual method for introduction in previous case studies.
For example, currently all PFA petitions in Philadelphia must first go before
a judge in an ex parte hearing.188 In filling out the relevant paperwork, a
petitioner might indicate a willingness to adjudicate his or her petition through
mediation. Thus, an ex parte hearing would be held—and an interim PFA order
perhaps granted. However, where petitioners elected to submit their case to a
mediator, the final PFA hearing—which is required to occur within ten days of
the ex parte hearing189—would not need to be scheduled. Instead, the court
183
184
185

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
See Busch, supra note 148, at 229 (explaining that the inequitable dynamic between victim
and abuser impedes meaningful negotiations).
186 See, e.g., Ptacek, supra note 114, at 17 (“[P]articipation is strictly voluntary.”).
187 However, one realm in which states have incorporated this form of mediation is in the context
of custody disputes. See, e.g., CHESTER CTY. CUSTODY RULES AND FORMS 1915.4.A(a)(1) (“All
complaints for custody . . . shall be scheduled for meditation within thirty (30) days of filing . . . .”).
188 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
189 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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would refer the petition to mediation. The abused party would pursue this route
knowing it would likely result in an order by agreement rather than an order
unilaterally decided by a court. However, unlike the current status quo, a guided
mediation process would ensure that abuse victims are not bullied or intimidated
into inadequate agreements.190 Instead, the mediation process would place an
emphasis on both empowerment and resolution. That is, therapeutic jurisprudence
and restorative justice ideals would inform the process.
These principles would provide an answer to the current deficiencies that
corrupt the manner in which orders by agreement are reached. The typical
agreement process attendant to PFA litigation typically stymies a victim’s ability to
attain both adequate and meaningful relief. In its place, the mediation would foster
a supervised, open dialogue. The victim would direct the discourse; the mediator
would act in a facilitative capacity. This collaborative process could also lead parties
to explore other corollary alternatives to traditional civil protection orders,
including counseling, coparenting opportunities, and drug and alcohol programs.
Utilizing alternative approaches as a supplement to the current civil
protection order proceeding model—rather than replacing it entirely—serves
many purposes. First, traditional proceedings would remain available for cases in
which alternative approaches may not be appropriate. Second, alternative
approaches positively contribute and potentially eliminate many challenges faced
by family courts, particularly crowded court dockets and the increasing number
of self-represented litigants. Finally, they address a host of litigants’ needs outside
of the need for physical protection and instead focus on restoring relationships
and preventing future instances of domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
Incorporating restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence concepts into
civil protection order proceedings would resolve many issues facing litigants and
courts alike. First, a therapeutic approach would facilitate a more sensitive
response to one of the most sensitive areas of legal practice. Second, introducing
a nonjudicial alternative to traditional protection order hearings would preserve
valuable court resources. Finally, affording litigants more personalized avenues
of relief would ensure victim autonomy and offender participation.
In the two scenarios set out in the introduction of this Essay, the traditional
protection order process failed to adequately meet the litigants’ needs. Neither
Petitioner One nor Two benefited from the civil justice system’s available
resources. Likewise, neither Respondent One nor Two accepted responsibility

190 See Busch, supra note 148, at 245-46 (arguing that hybrid systems should only be utilized
where safety mechanisms are in place).
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for his actions. Finally, and most importantly, none of the parties involved
acquired the necessary tools to decrease the likelihood of a future filing.191
This Essay argues that therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice
principles could vastly improve both outcomes. If Petitioners One or Two chose
to participate in an alternative approach akin to the solution proposed in this
Essay, all parties, as well as the civil justice system as a whole, could have
substantially benefited. Petitioner One and Respondent One could have had a
meaningful, facilitated discussion about the incident that precipitated the
Petitioner’s filing. Respondent One may have better understood how he made
Petitioner One feel, while Petitioner One could have made a more informed
decision about whether to withdraw her petition. In the second case, both parties
may have come to an agreement regarding custody if they had had an opportunity
to openly share their concerns with each other. Petitioner Two’s concerns could
have been heard, rather than deemed “not credible” by a third party with limited
access to evidence. Respondent Two may have been persuaded to take parenting
classes or to undergo counseling.
These scenarios serve as only two examples of the lives that could be changed
by incorporating the alternative approaches of therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice principles into protection order proceedings. Rather than
merely protecting survivors, an enhanced, therapeutic civil response could restore
relationships, redefine communities, and finally loosen the grip of domestic
violence on our society today.

191

See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.

